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I ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the appropriateness of damages as the pnmary 
remedy for breach of contract in New Zealand. It argues that the civil law 
approach to contractual remedies, which gives primacy to performance of the 
obligation, is superior to New Zealand's common law position, which merely 
seeks to replace the right to performance with an award of damages. The 
importance of both the normative and practical impact of the remedial 
framework is examined in order to demonstrate that specific performance is 
better able to facilitate commercial endeavours. The three justifications for the 
primacy of damages in the common law: the historical development; the 
economic theory of efficient breach; and the concern that specific performance 
will overburden the administration of justice are examined but rejected as 
adequate justification for the common law position. It contends that specific 
performance should be the primary remedy because it is more consistent with the 
principles that underlie the law of contract. It also contends that specific 
performance is more practical because it reduces conflict and promotes 
efficiency. The recommendation is that any change should be through 
appropriate legislation. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, 
Bibliography, and appendices) comprises approximately 14,908 words. 
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II INTRODUCTION 
Contractual rights are a major form of commercial wealth. 1 The law of 
contract endeavours to define and protect these rights. The availability of 
appropriate remedies is important to protect the value of contractual rights. In 
New Zealand the law of contract has traditionally been developed in accordance 
with the structure and principles of English common law.2 Consequently, the 
main mechanism for protecting contractual rights has been damages for breach of 
contract. It is the thesis of this paper that the law of contract should be revised 
and specific performance should become the primary remedy for breach of 
contract in New Zealand. 
In common law systems specific performance is an order of the court 
requiring the defendant to personally perform the promise they made.3 The 
defendant must actually fulfil their contractual obligation, for example deliver 
the chattel, or they will be held in contempt of court. In civil law systems the 
term is used more broadly and also includes actions to recover the price of 
having somebody else (including the plaintiff) perform the contract, the cost of 
curing a defect, or the cost of substitute goods.4 In cases where only the 
defendant can perform the contract the court will order them to do so. As in 
common law jurisdictions if they do not do so they will be fined or imprisoned. 5 
This analysis is mainly concerned with the situation where only the defendant 
can perform the contractual obligation, because it is in these cases that the 
difference between the common law and civil law approach is of the greatest 
practical importance. 
In New Zealand, as in all common law jurisdictions, specific performance 
can be awarded for breaches of contract but it is a discretionary remedy. In 
1 Daniel Friedmann "The Efficient Breach Fallacy" (1989) 18 J Legal Stud I, 23. 
2 John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd Law of Contract in New Zealand (2ed, Lexis 
Nexis Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 2. 
3 Gareth Jones & William Goodhart Specific Pe,formance (Butterworths, London, 1986) I. 
4 GH Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989) 46. 
5 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law (2ed, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1992) 509. 
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comparison contractual damages are paid as a matter of right when a breach of 
contract is established. 6 The reasons why specific performance is a 
supplementary remedy are largely historical although academic and judicial 
support for this position has developed based on more pragmatic grounds. 
Academic support for the primacy of damages has been expressed in the theory 
of efficient breach which has attempted to explain and justify the common law' s 
preference for damages. 7 Judicial support for the primacy of damages has 
acknowledged the efficiency arguments but has been more concerned with the 
burden supervising specific performance could have on the administration of 
justice.8 The historical basis for the primacy of damages, the theory of efficient 
breach, and the judicial concerns about the practical application of specific 
performance will be discussed to establish whether they are able to justify the 
primacy of damages in common law jurisdictions. These justifications are then 
contrasted with the philosophical and practical advantages of specific 
performance. 
Part III of this paper will discuss the aims the law seeks to achieve 
through the availability of remedies to identify the framework against which the 
relative value of damages and specific performance can be judged. Part IV 
discusses the development of specific performance to determine whether the 
historical differences between the common law and civil law continue to justify 
the different approaches to specific performance. In Part V the validity of the 
theory of efficient breach, as a modern justification for the primacy of damages, 
is discussed. Part VI addresses the concern that greater availability of specific 
performance will burden the administration of justice using the experience of 
Germany, a civil law jurisdiction, as a comparison. Part VII identifies the 
philosophical and practical advantages of specific performance. 
6 John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd Law of Contract in New Zealand (2ed, Lexis 
Nexis Butterworths, Wellington , 2002) 743 . 
7 For example Richard Posner The Economic Analysis of Law (Little & Brown , Boston, 1972). 
8 For example Co-operative insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [ 1998) AC I . 
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Ill THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 
A The Importance oftlte Remedial Framework 
Determining whether damages or specific performance is the more 
appropriate primary remedy for breaches of contract is not merely a comparative 
exercise. The availability of a philosophically sound, but pragmatic, remedial 
framework is as important as the substantive law that governs the contract 
because remedies give the contractual terms substance. A remedy ensures that 
the contract is worth more than the paper it is written on, turning normative 
statements into "living truths".9 Without an independent and reliable system for 
developing, awarding, and enforcing remedies a party to a contract with 
sufficient physical or economic strength would be able to breach with impunity. 
The available remedies must be clearly articulated and relevant 
information readily accessible to the parties. The remedial setting is the 
backdrop for the formation and performance of the contract and resolution of any 
disputes arising out of the contract. Matters of price and risk are affected by the 
remedies available. 10 The remedial backdrop is also important because the 
ability of parties to choose their own remedies is extremely limited. The parties 
cannot contract that in the event of breach the contract will be specifically 
performed. Nor can a contract contain a liquidated damages clause (which 
provides for damages to be paid by the defaulting party) if the damages which 
would be payable are so disproportionate to the actual amount of real damage 
that they are punitive. 11 
The starting point for determining the most appropriate form of remedy is 
the framework in which the remedy will operate and the purposes it must serve. 
A body of law governing commercial relationships is an important aspect of any 
legal system. The law of contract enables individuals to form relationships and 
deal with their property and other resources in an organised manner consistent 
9 Grant Hammond "The Place of Damages in the Scheme of Remedies" in PD Finn (Ed) Essays 
on Damages (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1992) 192. 
10 Richard Craswell "Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach" 
( 1988) 61 S Cal L Rev 629, 630 . 
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with their personal freedom. It balances the needs of the greater community 
against the personal benefit of the individual. Contracts are also a mechanism for 
allocating risk. Parties accept the detriment of being bound to their own 
promises in return for being able to rely on the other party or parties to the 
contract being bound by their promises. Risk allocation and the certainty risk 
allocation creates are fundamental to the promotion of commercial activity. The 
law of contract is also essential for resolving commercial disputes. 
B Freedom of Contract 
The law of contract governs the relationships between private individuals. 
The basic premise of contract law is the freedom of parties to enter into 
contractual relations. The principle of freedom of contract recognises that 
individuals have the ability to choose their contractual partners and mutually 
determine the scope and application of their agreements.
12 This freedom is 
subject to numerous limitations affecting both the form and substance of the 
agreement. The doctrines of consideration, mistake, frustration, duress, undue 
influence, unconscionability, and form requirements (such as the Contracts 
Enforcement Act 1956) all limit this principle. However, it is important to note 
that many of these doctrines were developed to ensure that parties to a contract 
do in fact choose to undertake the obligations they acquire under the contract. 
When an undertaking has been made voluntarily it is binding so long as 
circumstances proceed in the manner intended by the parties or reasonably within 
their contemplation during contract formation. 13 Consequently, these doctrines 
actually protect 'the right to choose' to enter into a contract. 
Parties choose to create a contractual relationship. They choose the 
nature and scope of their relationship, and willingly undertake the obligations in 
the contract in return for the performance or rights they correspondingly receive. 
If a person is forced to 'accept', the contract is voidable, and if it is not affirmed 
can be set aside on grounds of duress or undue influence. 14 That a party chooses 
11 Alan Schwartz "The Case for Specific Performance" (1979) 89 Yale Law Journal 271, 273-4. 
12 Richard A Epstein "In Defense of the Contract at Will" (1984) 51 U Chi L Rev 947, 953-55. 
13 Frustrated Contracts Act 1944. 
14 Allorney-Generalfor England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91, 111 Tipping J (CA). 
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to enter a contract is an important factor when determining whether or not the 
party should be expected to 'make good' the promise they voluntarily gave. In 
some circumstances the law deems a person to have manifested an intention they 
claim not to have had because the way they conducted themselves would have 
lead a reasonable person to believe they had the intention. 15 Consequently, the 
existence, scope, and value of any promises are determined by the parties. 
C Allocation of Risk 
Contracts allocate risk in two ways. First contracts allocate risk by 
binding parties to undertake certain activities or not undertaking others. This 
allows the promisee to plan their enterprises secure in the knowledge that certain 
activities will occur, will not occur, or particular resources will be provided to 
them, in return for the promise they themselves made. Secondly, contracts 
allocate risk because they allow the parties to determine who will bear the risk of 
certain events. 16 For example a fixed price clause allocates the risk to the vendor 
that the exchange rate will fluctuate reducing the profit they will receive. The 
vendor may agree to this risk for any number of reasons. Why the vendor agrees 
to the clause is not the concern of the promisee. The promisee's only concern is 
that they keep their promise to do so, ensuring that the risk lies with the party 
who accepted it and upon which the parties relied. 
D Resolution of Disputes 
It is inevitable that in the process of human interaction mistakes will be 
made, circumstances will change, people will 'fall out'. The court system is 
designed to facilitate the resolution of disputes. 17 The law of contract establishes 
a framework for issues such as these to be resolved. Through a public and 
accessible framework the law of contract also reduces the number of disputes, 
and in other cases reduces the intensity of the dispute, by establishing a system of 
15 Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597. 
16 Craig S Warkol "Resolving the Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial 
Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach" (1998) 20 Cardozo L Rev 321 , 347. 
17 New Zealand Law Commission Seeking Solutions: Options for Change to the New Zealand 
Court System (Part 2) (NZLC PP52, Wellington, 2002) 86. 
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precedent for subsequent parties to use in resolving their own cases. Even if 
parties use alternative methods of dispute resolution, such as arbitration or 
mediation, they do so with the legal framework informing their decisions. 18 
E Summary 
Remedies are an important part of the legal framework. The legal system 
has an important role in facilitating commercial endeavours. When determining 
the most appropriate remedy for breaches of contracts it is important to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the remedy in giving effect to: the parties ' choice to enter the 
contract; the risk allocation function of contract law; and the role of the law in 
reducing the occurrence of disputes and resolving disputes. 
IV JUSTIFYING THE PRIMACY OF DAMAGES- THE EQUITABLE 
ORIGINS OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
A History of Specific Performance in the Common Law 
The first justification for the primacy of damages in the common law is 
the historical development of the common law remedial framework. The 
primacy of damages is part of the heritage of the common law and reflects the 
competitive relationship between the common law courts and the courts of 
chancery.19 Historically the common law courts ordered specific performance in 
cases of failure to perform a public duty, delivery of a chattel in detinue, and 
under the writ of covenant for the conveyance of land. These were exceptions to 
the general rule that common law remedies were confined to damages and only 
the courts of chancery would order specific performance of contractual 
bl . · 20 o 1gat10ns. 
18 Gary Born international Commercial Arbitration (2ed, Transnational Publishers, New York, 
2001 ) 42. 
19 GH Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989) 70 . 
20 Robert J Sharpe injunctions and Specific Performance (2ed, Canada Law Book Inc, Toronto, 
1992) 7-1. 
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By the fifteenth century it was well established practice that petitioners to 
the courts of chancery could request a person to be compelled to do what they 
had promised. If the decree for specific performance was not complied with, the 
defendant was imprisoned. The basis for this remedy is not known but it is likely 
that specific performance was ordered because it was in accordance with good 
conscience which was the touchstone of the courts of chancery' s jurisdiction.2 1 
The concept of adequacy of damages developed later. It was not until the late 
eighteenth century that it became firmly established that specific performance 
would only be awarded when damages were inadequate to compensate the 
pro mi see for the loss suffered. 22 
Specific performance was an exceptional remedy partly because the 
courts of chancery had to be careful not to impinge upon the jurisdiction of the 
common law courts. The courts of chancery were to supplement not supplant 
the common law courts. Consequently, equity was only to be used when the 
common law courts were not capable of doing justice between the parties. The 
courts of chancery were reluctant to use contempt of court proceedings to redress 
private disputes.23 The courts of chancery were also concerned that their 
authority would be undermined if orders could not be enforced and the contempt 
proceedings were put to the test. 24 These concerns, which continue to resonate 
with modern jurists,25 do not adequately explain why this is particularly 
disturbing in cases of specific performance when in all private litigation there is a 
threat of contempt of court. 26 
B Equitable Remedy 
The equitable origins of specific performance are still relevant today in 
New Zealand. Although New Zealand' s courts are not divided into equitable and 
common law courts the origin of the action and the remedy determine both 
2 1 Gareth Jones & William Goodhart Specific Performance (Butterworths, London, 1986) 4. 
22 Jones & Goodhart, above, 6. 
23 GH Treitel Remedies f or Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989) 70. 
24 Robert J Sharpe injunctions and Specific Pe,formance (2ed, Canada Law Book Inc, Toronto, 
1992) 7-1. 
25 For example Co-operative insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1998) AC I . 
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availability and application. The most important fetter on equitable remedies is 
that they are discretionary. The equitable origins of specific performance are 
also relevant because equitable defences such as unfairness27 or hardship28 are 
available which are not available to an action for damages.29 For example, 
specific performance will be denied if it would take advantage of another's 
mistake or it would be unjust to order it.30 
C The Issue of Adequacy 
In New Zealand specific performance will be awarded when damages are 
inadequate.31 The test of adequacy of damages was developed to reduce the 
conflict between the common law courts and the courts of chancery. 32 The 
adequacy test is consistent with the principle that equitable remedies were only 
developed to supplement remedies available at common law. Although the 
adequacy test is consistent with the basis for the availability of equitable 
remedies it has been applied inconsistently. In early cases damages were 
inadequate if they were not a "complete remedy"33 and specific performance 
would achieve "more perfect and complete justice".34 In later cases specific 
performance would only be ordered where it was impossible to calculate the 
damages, and even where it was very difficult to calculate damages specific 
performance was not awarded.35 
26 For further discussion see paragraph VI(A)(2)(d) below. 
27 For example Attorney-Genera/ for England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91 the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal refused to grant an injunction restraining a former SAS soldier from publishing a 
book in breach of his employment agreement in part because of the inherent pressure to sign the 
contract and the fact he was told he could not take any independent advice. The other relevant 
factors were the lack of mutuality and considerations of freedom of speech. 
28 For example in Patel v Ali [ 1984] Ch 283 Goulding J refused to grant specific performance 
because after the sale of the house the vendor had become disabled and was heavily reliant on her 
neighbours for assistance which she would lose if forced to move. 
29 GH Treitel Remedies f or Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989) 46. 
30 Gareth Jones & William Goodhart Specific Performance (Butterworths, London, 1986) I 0. 
31 Loan Investment Corporation of Australasia v Bonner [ 1970] NZLR 724 (PC). 
32 GH Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989) 64. 
33 Adderley v Dixon ( 1824) I Sim & St 607, 610 Leach VC. 
34 Wilson v Northampton and Banbury Junction Rly Co (1874) 9 Ch App 279, 284 Lord Selborne. 
35 For example Societe des Industries Metallurgiques SA v Bronx Engineering Co Ltd [1975] I 
Lloyd ' s Rep 465. 
9 
In addition to the difficulties in application the adequacy test has been 
criticised as "arbitrary and irrational".36 The adequacy test articulated the 
relationship between common law and equity but it does not express the role of 
remedies in giving effect to contractual obligations or the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. As the historical basis for the adequacy test has been 
removed by the merging of the common law courts and the courts of chancery, 
the availability of remedies should be reconsidered in light of current social and 
economic expectations of the law of contract. While the historical basis for the 
adequacy test has been removed both the adequacy test and the superiority of 
damages over specific performance have more recently been defended and 
affirmed on the basis of economic efficiency and cost effectiveness. 
V JUSTIFYING THE PRIMACY OF DAMAGES - THE THEORY OF 
EFFICIENT BREACH 
Although the historical reasons are no longer a sufficient justification, for 
the primacy of damages in the common law, academic support for this approach 
to remedies has developed based upon the theory of efficient breach. Before 
examining the theory of efficient breach a short outline of the types of damages 
that are available is given to help demonstrate the difficulties in calculating the 
loss the promisee has suffered. 
A The Theory of Damages 
The purpose of contractual damages is to put the promisee in the position 
they would have been in had the contract been performed.37 There are different 
ways of calculating how to achieve this depending upon the particular 
circumstances. The recognised categories of loss are the restitution interest, the 
reliance interest, and the expectation interest. 
36 JP Dawson "Specific Performance in France and Germany" (1959) 57 Mich LR 495, 532. 
37 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co ( 1880) 5 App Cas 25 , 39 Lord Blackburn . 
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The restitution interest is the right to restoration of a valuable benefit 
conferred on the other party and to which they are not entitled. 38 
The reliance interest is the right to compensation for loss incurred in steps 
taken in reliance upon the existence of the contract. The reliance interest can be 
further divided into the reliance performance losses and extraneous reliance 
losses. Reliance performance losses are losses resulting from steps taken by the 
innocent party to perform the contract. Extraneous reliance losses are losses 
which the innocent party incurred not in relation to the performance of the 
contract but only in the expectation that the defaulting party would perform their 
obligations. 39 
The expectation interest 1s the right to compensation for the loss of 
bargain. The expectation interest aims to financially restore the promisee to the 
position they would have been in had the contract been performed.40 The 
expectation interest is the primary basis for calculating contract damages because 
the promisee is entitled to be put in the position they would have been in had the 
contract been performed.4 1 
Although the above categories of loss are straightforward in theory the 
practical calculation of damages can be a very difficult, time consuming, and 
costly exercise.42 Despite the difficulty of calculating and recovering damages 
the theory of efficient breach states that if it is still in the promisor's interests to 
breach the contract, after fully compensating the promisee, they should do so. 
B The Theory of Efficient Breach 
Even though there are many difficulties associated with the calculation of 
damages economic theory has been invoked to both explain and justify the 
common law position. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote "The duty to 
38 Newmans Tours Ltd v Ranier Investments Ltd [ 1992] 2 NZLR 68, 86 Fisher J (HC). 
39 Newmans Tours Ltd v Ranier Investments Ltd, above, 86 Fisher J (HC). 
40 Newmans Tours Ltd v Ranier Investments lid, above, 86 Fisher J (HC). 
4 1 Bloxham v Robinson 7 TCLR 122, 133 (CA). 
42 Thomas S Ulen "The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of 
Contract Remedies" (1984) 83 Michigan Law Review 341 , 378. 
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keep a contract at common law is a prediction that you must pay damages if you 
do not keep it, - and nothing else".43 This can be contrasted with the approach in 
civil law where a breach does not defeat the promisee' s right to receive 
performance but rather provides them with the opportunity to have their claim for 
performance supported by the courts.44 The common law's continuing 
preference for damages has been justified as more economical than the civil law 
approach because damages allow the promisor to breach when it is more efficient 
for them to do so than to perform the contract. 
An efficient breach is a wilful breach by one party by either performing 
the contract with a third party for a greater profit or refusing to perform the 
contract to avoid loss that would result from that performance. 45 The theory of 
efficient breach justifies these breaches on the basis that promisors who breach 
contracts increase society's welfare when the benefit of the breach is greater than 
the promisee's losses. If a party can compensate the promisee for any loss 
resulting from the breach and still generate a greater profit they should breach the 
contract. 46 
An example of an efficient breach is when A contracts to build a machine 
for B for which A will receive a net profit of $10,000. Before A begins building 
the machine, C requests A to build another machine for which A will receive a 
net profit of $20,000. A is unable to make both machines but if A breaches with 
B it will cost B $2,000 above the original cost of the machine to get another 
manufacturer to perform the original contract. According to the efficient breach 
theory A should breach the contract with B because even after compensating B, 
A will be $8,000 better off. A second example is when A contracts to sell certain 
goods to B for $100. C later offers A $200 for the same goods. A is unable to 
supply both contracts. It will cost B an additional $10 to replace the goods. 
43 Oliver Wendell Holmes "The Path of Law" (1897) I O Harv L Rev 457, 462. 
44 Charles Szladits "The Concept of Specific Performance in Civil Law" Am J Comp L IV 208, 
220-1 . 
45 Joshua Cender "Knocking Opportunism: A Reexamination of Efficient Breach of Contract" 
( 1995) Ann Surv Am L 689 . 
46 Craig S Warkol "Resolving the Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial 
Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach" ( 1998) 20 Cardozo L Rev 321-2. 
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Even after compensating B, A will make an additional profit of $90 and 
according to the theory of efficient breach should breach the contract. 
Examples such as these are used to demonstrate that society receives a net 
benefit because the goods and services are moved to the user who values them 
most. They are also used to justify why expectancy damages should be awarded 
as opposed to punitive damages or specific performance, which would have the 
effect of making the breach less efficient, thereby reducing or withdrawing the 
net benefit to society.47 
C Critique of the Theory of Efficient Breach 
1 Introduction 
The efficient breach theory has received widespread academic support. 
However, it can be criticised on three alternative grounds. First, it is inconsistent 
with the normative aims of contract law. Secondly, even if the theory 1s 
accepted, it fails to translate into practice because the costs the promiser 1s 
expected to weigh in deciding whether a breach would be efficient are rarely as 
concrete as the examples used when developing the theory. Consequently in 
practice the theory perpetuates inefficient breaches. Thirdly, the theory of 
efficient breach is inconsistent with other areas of law, in particular with the 
developing doctrine of good faith. 
2 Normative difficulties with the theory of efficient breach 
Economic analysis views the legal system as merely an institution to 
promote efficiency. Consequently contracts are viewed as a mechanism to 
facilitate the exchange of goods and services to where they are valued most. 
Therefore if a contract impedes that exchange breach of that contract should be 
encouraged. 48 This approach is inconsistent with the law's aim of preventing and 
resolving conflict, the purpose of creating a contract, the intrinsic value of a 
47 Frank Menetrez "Consequential ism, Promissory Obligation, and the Theory of Efficient 
Breach" (2000) UCLA L Rev 859, 861 . 
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promise, and the laws concern to prevent people from profiting from their own 
wrongdoing. 
(a) The law seeks to reduce conflict 
The legal system is a formal mechanism for resolving disputes. It also 
helps to discourage disputes by making it clear that in similar situations the same 
rules will be applied. It endeavours to protect reliance and expectation interests 
in order to reduce conflict. Breaches, irrespective of whether or not they are 
efficient, lead to disputes. The legal system recognises that legal actions, and the 
remedies they lead to, are merely substitutes for private warfare.
49 In 
comparison, the theory of efficient breach encourages "breach first, talk 
afterwards". so It encourages one party to unilaterally determine the direction of a 
bilateral relationship. Such behaviour will inevitably lead to ill-will and conflict. 
The non-breaching party is unlikely to be satisfied with the response "it was 
more efficient for me to let you down than to fulfil our contract". The theory of 
efficient breach does not allow for intangible human reactions. It assumes that 
everybody is a rational economic actor who will be satisfied by an award of 
damages. 51 
The efficient breach theory is also incompatible with another basic 
premise of the legal system - that property (including contractual rights) should 
not be interfered with without consent except in very exceptional cases. 
52 The 
efficient breach theory effectively allows an individual to determine what use 
somebody else ' s property should be put to without their knowledge or consent.
53 
48 Menetrez, above, 883. 
49 Joseph M. Perillo "Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious 
Interference" (2000) 68 Fordham L Re 1085, 1092-3. 
50 Perillo, above, I I 02; Ian R Macneil "Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky" ( 1982) 
68 Va L R 947, 968. 
51 Craig S Warkol "Resolving the Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial 
Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach" (1998) 20 Cardozo L Rev 321 , 343. 
52 For example trespass to save property or life. 
53 Daniel Friedmann "The Efficient Breach Fallacy" ( 1989) 18 J Legal Stud I, 14. 
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Furthermore, the reasoning that supports the theory of efficient breach 
leads to the theory of efficient theft or efficient conversion. 54 If it is sufficient 
justification to breach a contract and thereby subvert another's contractual rights 
because of the net benefit to society, then it must also be justifiable to subvert 
any other form of property where the net benefit to society will be greater. 
However, in practice this is obviously not the case. When property is converted, 
the remedy is restitution of the profits that followed the action and not merely 
damages. When a promise is recognised as enforceable it takes on many of the 
attributes of property. It is protected from interference by third parties and is 
often assignable. It should also be protected from appropriation by the 
· 55 prom1sor. 
(b) Purpose of a contract 
The essential purpose of a contract is the performance of the promises it 
encompasses. The bargain is made for the performance of the promise, not for a 
promise and the right to win a lawsuit. 56 Furthermore, in accordance with the 
principle of freedom of contract, if parties to a contract wish to stipulate that a 
promisor is allowed to breach subject only to the payment of damages they are 
free to do so. Parties have a right to be even more specific and could include a 
liquidated damages clause setting out the damages to be paid on breach. A 
liquidated damages clause will be set aside if the amount it provides for is 
excessively high because it 1s considered to be punitive rather than 
compensatory. However, practically the parties may choose not to include a 
liquidated damages clause because of the additional costs involved in negotiation 
or because of the difficulty in determining the probable loss. 57 
In contrast, the efficient breach theory undermines the promisee's 
freedom to determine its contractual relationships because it allows the promisor 
54 Friedmann, above, 4. 
55 Joseph M. Perillo "Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious 
lnterference"(2000) 68 Fordham L Re 1085, 1106. 
56 Perillo, above, I 093-4. 
57 Timothy J Muris "Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The Relevance of 
Subjective Value" (1983) 12 J Legal Studies 379, 380. 
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to unilaterally determine the 'best use ' of the promisee 's property.
58 This is 
inconsistent with the parties' motivations for entering into the contract and the 
principle of freedom of contract. 
The prov1s1on of remedies for breach does not mean that the law of 
contract has implied a term into the contract that encourages or justifies breach. 
The purpose of a remedy is to vindicate a right not to replace it. 
59 That a 
promisee can seek redress through the legal system in no way justifies the 
promiser's breach. 
The theory of efficient breach also undermines the risk allocation 
function of contracts. Contracts allocate risk because they create certainty and 
allow parties to plan ahead. Parties enter into contracts and allow their own 
future behaviour to be regulated because it is convenient to also know how the 
other party will act in the future . This knowledge reduces the level of risk 
inherent in an enterprise. If a promiser is able to escape a promise because it is 
no longer as profitable as it once was, then securing goods or services and 
planning becomes very difficult. 60 
( c) The value of a promise 
The efficient breach theory also fails to account for the true value of the 
bargain reached because it does not acknowledge that the exchanged promises 
have any intrinsic value and are therefore a valuable part of the transaction. 
Promises generate an obligation to make the future conform to a particular 
description. 61 On an ordinary understanding the making of a promise imposes an 
obligation to perform the promise. In contrast if the efficient breach theory is 
applied, there is no obligation to perform the promise. The fact that a promise 
has been made is just one factor to be taken into account when deciding whether 
58 Daniel Friedmann "The Efficient Breach Fallacy" (1989) 18 J Legal Stud 1, 23. 
59 Friedmann, above, I. 
6° Craig S Warkol "Resolving the Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial 
Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach" ( 1998) 20 Cardozo L Rev 321, 347. 
6 1 Frank Menetrez "Consequential ism, Promissory Obligation, and the Theory of Efficient 
Breach" (2000) UCLA L Rev 859, 873 . 
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or not to perform the contract. 62 The purpose of promising is to bind someone 
else's will to ensure they perform the promised activity. That the promise 
remains binding is of particular importance when the action required is against 
the promisor's self-interest. If it was in their interest it is less likely they would 
fail to perform.63 Economic analysis rejects the idea of a moral obligation to 
keep a promise because the purpose of the legal system is to increase aggregate 
wealth and not command obedience to an agreement that lacks practical utility.
64 
However, this approach reduces the legal system to a mere mechanism for setting 
prices in the form of damages. 65 
( d) Who should receive the benefit? 
The crucial issue is who should benefit from a third party's offer to pay a 
d · 66 higher price for the goo s or service. The efficient breach theory is 
objectionable because it attempts to justify why the promisor should attain a 
benefit through the commission of a wrong (the breach of contract).
67 If any 
benefit is to accrue, it should be to the original promisee because the realisation 
of any benefit is dependent upon the contractual rights of the promisee. 
It has been suggested that in cases where the cost of full performance is 
greater than the value of that performance to the promisee the routine grant of 
specific performance may lead to the promisor having to ' bribe ' the promisee to 
settle the case. 68 This proposition fails to recognise that, where the cost of 
performance is greater than the value the promisee will accrue, allowing the 
promisor not to perform results in unjust enrichment of the promisor.
69 A legal 
system that restricts the availability of specific performance undermines the 
62 Menetrez, above, 877. 
63 Menetrez, above, 883-4 . 
64 Richard Morrison "Efficient Breach of International Agreements" ( 1994) 23 Denv J Intl L & 
Poly 183 , 190-1. 
65 Daniel Friedmann "The Efficient Breach Fallacy" ( 1989) 18 J Legal Stud I. 
66 Friedmann, above, 5. 
67 Friedmann, above, 6. 
68 Anthony Kronman "Specific Performance" ( 1978) 45 U Chi LR 351 , 366-7 . 
69 Joseph M. Perillo "Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious 
Interference" (2000) 68 Fordham L Re 1085, 1103 . 
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parties' faith in realising their bargain.70 Therefore, the law should err on the 
side of protecting the promisee rather than the promisor. 
3 The practical difficulties with the theory of efficient breach 
Even if the philosophical difficulties with the theory of efficient breach 
were overcome or disregarded the practical application of the theory of efficient 
breach faces a number of obstacles. The theory of efficient breach is premised 
on making a profit once the promisee has been compensated. Ensuring the 
promisee has been fully compensated is very difficult in practice. The first 
hurdle is determining the true extent of the loss suffered. If this hurdle is 
overcome the law of contract contains a number of doctrines which have the 
effect of preventing the promisee from recovering the full extent of their loss. 
However, even if the legal system did not inhibit the functioning of the theory of 
efficient breach in this way, the theory would still be inefficient because of the 
additional transactions it creates. Furthermore, there must be doubts as to the 
ability of the promisor to actually predict the costs that will be generated and 
determine whether or not a breach is truly 'efficient'. Finally, the theory of 
efficient breach makes a number of assumptions about the parties ' behaviour 
which will not necessarily occur. 
(a) The difficulty of counting the 'cost' 
In the examples used to illustrate the theory of efficient breach it is very 
easy to calculate the loss suffered by the promisee. It is unlikely to be as clear-
cut in practice. Significant losses can result from a breach of contract because 
individual contracts are frequently part of a much larger commercial 
endeavour. 71 If a promisor breaches a contract this may have a ' ripple ' effect. 
The promisee may be forced to breach or renegotiate many other contracts with 
7° Friedmann, above, 7. 
71 Joshua Cender " Knocking Opportunism: A Reexamination of Efficient Breach of Contract" 
(1995) Ann Surv Am L 689, 717. 
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other parties. The losses suffered by the promisee will be difficult to calculate 
and harder still to prove in court. 72 
Although the promisee is entitled to consequential damages, such costs 
are often difficult to quantify. For example the time taken finding a replacement 
contractor or negotiating a new deal may be difficult to calculate. 73 Furthermore, 
if it is a commercial contract compensation for the frustration this exercise will 
create is not recoverable. 74 Expectation damages can be difficult to calculate 
because it is often speculative what the 'loss in value' suffered by the promisee 
amounts to. 75 It may also be difficult to calculate the loss suffered by the 
promisee because of the delay between formation of the contract, breach, and 
resolution of the dispute. 76 Unmeasurable subjective losses and 'unforeseeable' 
losses result in the promisee suffering more harm than an award of expectation 
damages compensates. 77 Conversely, specific performance or an award of the 
cost of completion may be more expensive than the amount needed to 
compensate the plaintiff for the breach. 78 
It is very difficult to calculate what the promisee's expected profit was at 
the time of contract formation. This is particularly difficult in the case of lost 
volume sellers. For lost volume sellers it must be established that the seller has 
suffered a lower volume of sales and that a substitute transaction was not 
available because they could have supplied all potential customers irrespective of 
the promisers order. 79 In the case of the seller's breach it can be very difficult to 
determine whether the buyer's expectation interest is more appropriately 
72 Friedmann, above, 13 . 
73 Craig S Warkol "Resolving the Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial 
Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach" ( 1998) 20 Cardozo L Rev 321 , 349. 
74 Anderson v Davies [ 1997] I NLZR 616, 626 (HC) Paterson J. 
75 Joshua Cender "Knocking Opportunism: A Reexamination of Efficient Breach of Contract" 
( 1995) Ann Surv Am L 689, 696. 
MCendeGabove, 702. 
77 Richard Craswell "Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach" 
( 1988) 61 S Cal L Rev 629, 636. 
78 Craswell, above, 637. 
79 Thomas S Ulen "The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of 
Contract Remedies" ( 1984) 83 Michigan Law Review 34 I, 361. 
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measured by the consumer surplus that was expected or by the buyer's subjective 
valuation of the completed contract. 80 
(b) The legal system inhibits full recovery 
In theory a perfect contract would account for every possible 
contingency. However. transaction costs and the inability to predict all future 
events result in all contracts being incomplete. 81 If people entered into complete 
contracts the law would not have to provide default terms, such as remedies, 
because they would be provided as the parties perceived them to be needed. 
82 
However, the default position provided by the legal system creates limitations 
that prevent the full recovery of loss caused by a breach of contract. Real and 
substantial damages are not able to be compensated unless they meet the 
requisite standards of foreseeability. The plaintiff must take reasonable steps to 
mitigate their loss, and in commercial cases the plaintiff cannot recover for the 
frustration and stress caused by the breach. These requirements greatly limit the 
damages available to a plaintiff in an action for breach of contract. 
83 In addition 
the cost of resolving the inevitable dispute is unlikely to be fully compensated. 
These limitations prevent the theory of efficient breach working in practice 
because the theory of efficient breach is premised on being able to compensate 
the promisee for the loss they suffer. 
Hadley v Baxendale84 established that the loss must be foreseeable in 
order to recover damages. Unless a plaintiff has informed a defendant of special 
circumstances which lead to further loss only generally foreseeable damages will 
be available. 85 A common loss which is not recoverable is the loss of profit on a 
w Ulen , above, 363. 
81 Eric Posner '·Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?" 
(2003) 112 Yale LJ 829,833. 
~ Posner, above, 866. 
83 Joshua Cender "Knocking Opportunism: A Reexamination of Efficient Breach of Contract" 
( 1995) Ann Surv Am L 689, 694 . 
8
~ 156 Eng Rep 145 (1854); ( 1854) 9 Exch 341. 
85 John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd law of Contract in New Zealand (2ed, Lexis 
exis Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 768. 
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sub-contract. Unless the breaching party knew or ought to have known of the 
sub-contract they are not responsible for the resulting loss. 
86 
The non-breaching party is required to take all reasonable steps to reduce 
their losses. 87 Mitigation may include accepting a less advantageous offer from 
the breaching party and then suing to recover the difference. 
88 If a non-breaching 
party fails to mitigate the recoverable damages will be reduced to reflect this. 
Compensatory damages do not fully compensate the promisee because 
damages for emotional distress are not recoverable in contract unless the case fits 
into one of the exceptions to the general rule. 
89 The Courts have stopped short 
of giving stress damages for breach of ordinary commercial contracts because, 
although such damages may be foreseeable, stress is an ordinary incident of 
commercial or professional life. Ordinary commercial contracts are not intended 
to protect parties from anxiety.9
0 In Rowlands v Collow91 Justice Thomas was of 
the opinion that there was no need for a special rule because the ordinary 
principles of remoteness are sufficient to ensure plaintiffs do not receive a 
windfall. This approach has received academic support
92 but was rejected by the 
Court of Appeal in Bloxham v Robinson
93 who held that in commercial cases an 
award for injury to feelings was inappropriate. 
Furthermore, the transaction costs of resolving the dispute that arise out 
of the breach are also not usually recovered in full. The amount of court costs 
86 Seve Seas Propewrties Ltd v Al-Essa [ 1993] I WLR 1083 . 
87 British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co v Underground Electric Rly Co of 
London [ 1912] AC 673 , 689 Lord Haldane. 
88 Pay=u ltdvSaunders [1919] 2 KB 581,589 Scrutton LJ. 
89 The general rule in Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [ 1909] AC 488 preventing recovery for 
emotional distress does not apply to cases of physical inconvenience, breaches arising from a 
contract the object of which is to prevent annoyance is, and contracts the object of which is to 
provide enjoyment, such as for a holiday. These exceptions have been developed because the 
defendant failed to do something contemplated within the case itself. Grant Hammond "The 
Place of Damages in the Scheme of Remedies" in PD Finn (Ed) Essays on Damages (The Law 
Book Company, Sydney, 1992) 192, 218-219. 
9° Clark Boyce v Moual [1992] 2 NZLR 559, 569 (CA) Cooke P. 
9 1 
[ 1992] I NZLR 178. 
92 DW McLauchlan " Mental Distress Damages for Breach of Commercial Contracts" (1997) 3 
NZBLQ 130. 
93 
( 18 June 1996) Court of Appeal CA 198/94 McKay, Thomas and Temm JJ (Thomas 
dissenting) [noted at [1996] 2 NZLR 664] . 
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and disbursements awarded to a successful party often bear no relation to the 
actual costs incurred by the non-breaching party. 94 In New Zealand costs awards 
generally amount to between 40 to 70 percent of the actual, reasonable costs 
incurred.95 Furthermore, not only do litigation costs preclude litigation, but a 
favourable judgment cannot be collected if the defendant cannot pay.
96 
( c) Additional transactions 
The efficient breach theory leads to greater inefficiency because it creates 
more transactions than if the contract had been performed. If the contract was 
performed the promisee could have negotiated to enter another contract with the 
buyer willing to pay a higher price. This is one additional transaction. In 
comparison if the promisor chooses to breach the contract, there will be as a 
minimum two additional transactions. First, there will be the transaction with the 
new buyer. Secondly, there will be the transaction forced upon the original 
promisee as a result of the breach. It is unrealistic to assume there will be no 
transaction costs in making the compensation payment. It is likely only to be 
resolved after negotiation or litigation. It may also lead to a third transaction, a 
tort action against the new buyer for inducing breach of contract. 
97 
In comparison if the primary remedy for breach of contract was specific 
performance, the parties would have an incentive to act efficiently. Entitlement 
to specific performance is a right and according to economic theory the holder of 
such a right will surrender the right by bargaining to an efficient result.
98 The 
cost of renegotiation will also influence the decision whether to breach, perform 
94 Joseph M. Perillo "Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious 
Interference" 68 Fordham L Re I 085, I 094; New Zealand Law Commission Seeking Solutions: 
Options for Change to the New Zealand Court System (Part 2) (NZLC PP52, Wellington, 2002) 
94. 
95 New Zealand Law Commiss ion Seeking Solutions: Options for Change to the New Zealand 
Court System (Part 2) (NZLC PP52, Wellington, 2002) 95 . 
96 Richard Morrison "Efficient Breach of International Agreements" ( 1994) 23 Denv J Intl L & 
Poly 183, 195. 
97 Daniel Friedmann "The Effici ent Breach Fallacy" ( 1989) 18 J Legal Stud I, 6-7. 
98 Joseph M. Perillo "Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious 
Interference" 68 Fordham L Re 1085, 1099. 
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or renegotiate.99 When making this decision it is important to remember that 
negotiation is a more efficient method of dispute resolution than the litigation 
that might result from breach. Negotiation is more efficient because the 
transaction costs of negotiation tend to be lower than the transaction costs of 
1. . · 100 1t1gation. 
If the parties cannot negotiate a settlement, remedies that deter breach are 
still more likely to reduce the number of such transactions if only because the 
defendant has less to gain from the breach. Transaction costs will accordingly be 
reduced because the promisee is provided with protection against the breach of 
contract through mechanisms such as specific performance and restitution.
101 
( d) The promiser cannot determine the costs 
Calculating the costs involved in a prospective breach will not necessarily 
be a straightforward task. To work effectively the promiser will need to 
undertake an extensive cost-benefit analysis. The most difficult part of this 
analysis will be calculating the promisee ' s loss. Even if the promiser is aware of 
what the pro mi see had ' expected' to gain from the contract and that the promisee 
has entered into sub-contracts in reliance they are unlikely to have sufficiently 
detailed information to determine whether the breach will be efficient or not. 
Importantly, relevant information may not even be available until after the 
contract is breached. In all but the clearest of cases it will be very difficult (if not 
impossible) for the promiser to determine in advance whether a breach will be 
efficient. 102 
99 Richard Craswell "Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach" 
( 1988) 61 S Cal L Rev 629, 632. 
100 Perillo, above, 1100. 
10 1 Daniel Friedmann "The Efficient Breach Fallacy" ( 1989) 18 J Legal Stud I, 7. 
102 Friedmann, above, 13 . 
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( e) Assumptions about behaviour 
To work in practice the theory of efficient breach requires the breaching 
party to compensate the promisee imrnediately.
103 The promisor is unlikely to 
pay the necessary compensation without first being required to do so by the 
promisee. The efficient breach theory assumes that a breach will be detected and 
the victim will sue for damages so they will suffer no loss. However, even if the 
breach is detected the victim may choose not to sue. 
104 They may decide that 
they are unwilling to undertake the cost of litigation including delay. In New 
Zealand it has been suggested that it is not worth pursuing a claim that is less 
than $50,000. 105 If a promisee is unable to recover damages this makes the 
breach inefficient. 106 
4 The theory of efficient breach is inconsistent with other areas of 
law 
The theory of efficient breach is not consistent with other doctrines and 
remedies available in both contract and other areas of the law of private 
obligations. Importantly, it is inconsistent with the developing doctrine of good 
faith and if for no other reason should be rejected on this basis. 
(a) Contract, torts, and restitution 
It is incorrect to say the law of contract wants to encourage efficient 
breaches as other aspects of the law of contract also demonstrate the laws 
disapproval of breaches of contract. The theory of efficient breach is implicitly 
rejected by the availability of specific performance, punitive damages, and the 
rule that a pre-existing obligation cannot be consideration for a new contract with 
the party to whom the obligation is owed because the promisor is already obliged 
103 Craig S Warkol "Resolving the Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial 
Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach" (1998) 20 Cardozo L Rev 321 , 349. 
104 Joshua Cender "Knocking Opportunism: A Reexamination of Efficient Breach of Contract" 
( 1995) Ann Surv Am L 689, 700 . 
105 Austin Forbes QC Law Talk (April 1997) 473 11 , 12. (Former President of the New Zealand 
Law Society). 
106 Cende~ above, 700 . 
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to perform that obligation.
107 The developing doctrine of economic duress is also 
inconsistent with the theory of efficient breach. In addition the rule requiring 
certainty of damages is relaxed when the breach is wilful.
108 Important! y, 
contract law already provides for situations where performance should be 
excused due to intervening events or a significant misapprehension by one or 
both of the parties through the doctrines of frustration and mistake. 
The theory of efficient breach is inconsistent with the tort of interference 
with contractual relations.
109 "It is a violation of a legal right to interfere with 
contractual relations recognised by law if there be no sufficient justification for 
the interference." 110
 The defendant must have known of the contract' 
11 which 
will prevent an action being brought when a customer merely approaches a seller 
and offers them a better price for the goods without knowing or being made 
aware of the existing contract. However, good faith and acting in the public 
interest are not sufficient justification for inducing the breach.
112 Consequently, 
the efficiency arguments which underpin the theory of efficient breach are 
unlikely to assist the defendant. 
Contractual rights also receive protection against third parties m 
restitution. If a third party receives the performance promised to another they 
will be liable in restitution unless they acquired title in good faith for value 
without notice. 113 The purpose of a restitutionary claim is not to compensate for 
loss suffered but to transfer any increase in value of the assets to the owner. The 
owner is the person the law gives the sole right to use the property as he or she 
thinks fit. I 14 
107 Daniel Friedmann "The Efficient Breach Fallacy" ( 1989) 18 J Legal Stud 1, 18-20. The 
doctrine of economic duress is developing see Dimskal Shipping Co SA v international Transport 
Workers Federation [1991] 4 All ER 871. 
108 Joseph M. Perillo "Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious 
Interference" 68 Fordham L Re 1085, 110 I. 
109 Friedmann, above, 20; Perillo, above, 1100. 
110 Quinn v Leathern [ 1901] AC 495 , 510 (HL) Lord MacNaghton. 
111 Stephen Todd ( ed) The law of Torts in New Zealand (3ed, Brookers, Wellington, 200 I) 618. 
11 2 Todd, above, 631-2. 
11 3 Daniel Friedmann "The Efficient Breach Fallacy" (1989) 18 J Legal Stud 1, 22. 
11 4 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law (2ed, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1992) 583. 
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(b) Good Faith 
The theory of efficient breach is inconsistent with the concept of good 
faith because it does not give any weight to the promises exchanged and 
encourages one party to unilaterally determine the direction of the relationship. 
Good faith is a mechanism for excluding 'bad faith' behaviour.
115 It equips 
judges to deal with those cases which lead to 'bad law' by using the principle to 
justify a one-off decision on particular facts.
116 A developed principle of good 
faith is a protective umbrella. 
Traditionally English contract law did not recognise a general duty of 
good faith. 117 Classical contract theory has been hostile to the development of a 
general doctrine of good faith. It is viewed as a threat to freedom of contract, the 
certainty of the law of contract, and inconsistent with the adversarial position of 
the parties. 118 Although a general doctrine of good faith is yet to be accepted, the 
courts have developed equitable principles such as fiduciary duties, 
unconscionable bargains, estoppel, and restitution.
119 Consequently, good faith 
principles are already substantively recognised in the general law.
120 
The doctrine of good faith is yet to be incorporated into every contract
121 
in New Zealand. Rather it is a developing doctrine as it underpins many aspects 
of the current law and a wider application has received judicial support. His 
Honour Justice Thomas has championed a general concept of good faith in both 
making and performing contracts. 1
22 His Honour understood good faith as 
"loyalty to a promise". 123 Promoting "loyalty to a promise" will ensure a high 
level of international business confidence in New Zealand's commercial 
115 AF Mason "Contract, Good Faith and Equitable Standards in Fair Dealing" (2000) 116 LQR 
66, 69. 
11 6 Roger Brownsword Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-First Century (Butterworths, 
London, 2000) s 5. 16. 
11 7 Mason, above, 66. 
11 8 Mason, above, 70-1 . 
11 9 Mason, above, 83-93. 
120 Mason, above, 94. 
12 1 As it is in America by virtue of section 205 of the Restatement of Contracts, Second. 
122 Livingstone v Roskilly [ 1992] 3 NLZR 230 (HC); Bobux Marketing Ltd v Raynor Marketing 
Ltd [2002] I NZLR 506 (CA); "An Affirmation of the Fiduciary Principle" [1996] NZLJ 405. 
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environment. It will also better equip New Zealand enterprises to operate in the 
international commercial arena which, as demonstrated by instruments such as 
the CISG 124 and Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts
125
, 
incorporates a duty of good faith . Therefore, the theory of efficient breach is 
inconsistent with the international commercial environment which New Zealand 
enterprises operate, or aspire to operate, in. 
D Summary 
The theory of efficient breach is a modern justification for the primacy of 
damages in the common law. The theory of efficient breach views specific 
performance as a hindrance to the allocation of resources to the party who values 
them most. However, the theory of efficient breach must be rejected as sufficient 
justification for the common law position because it is conceptually flawed and 
does not work in practice. The theory of efficient breach does not give adequate 
consideration to the law's role in preventing and resolving conflict, the purpose 
of creating a contract, the intrinsic value of a promise, and the law' s concern to 
prevent people profiting from their own transgressions. The theory of efficient 
breach does not work in practice because promisors will be unable to determine 
accurately whether or not a particular breach will be efficient. This is 
compounded by legal doctrines which limit the ability of the promisee to recover 
fully. However, even if these two obstacles could be overcome the theory is 
itself inefficient because it generates more transactions, and therefore related 
costs, than specific performance. In addition the theory is premised upon the 
assumption that, as rational economic actors, promisees will not be upset by the 
promisor being able to unilaterally determine the best use of the promisee' s 
contractual rights. As a result of these internal difficulties and its inconsistency 
with other interrelated areas of law the theory of efficient breach must be rejected 
as a justification for the supremacy of damages. 
123 Bobux Marketing Ltd v Raynor Marketing Ltd [2002] I NZLR 506, 516 [41] (CA) Thomas J 
dissenting. 
124 United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods 1980 Art 7( I). 
125 Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts Art 1.7. 
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VI JUSTIFYING THE PRIMACY OF DAMAGES -PROTECTING THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
The primacy of damages in the common law has also been justified on 
the basis that it is the more practical approach to resolving contractual disputes. 
This argument is supported by the orthodox position with respect to the 
differences between the common law and the civil law approach to specific 
performance. The orthodox position is that although they may have different 
starting points the same conclusion is reached in the end - that is most 
commercial disputes are resolved through an award of damages.
126 This section 
uses Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd
127 
(Argyll) to demonstrate that although this may be true of contracts for the sale of 
generic goods the outcomes are not always the same. In doing so the weaknesses 
of the 'practical' concerns, namely the issue of supervision, the limits to personal 
freedom, unwanted performance, and commercial expectations, which have 
justified the common law position are also demonstrated. 
A The Issue of Supervision 
1 The issue 
Difficulty in supervision is not an absolute bar to specific performance 
but rather one of the factors that must be balanced in determining whether or not 
it should be granted. 128 Concern has been expressed that specific performance 
strains the administration of justice because in many cases it will not be possible 
for the court to be sufficiently clear what performance is due or to adequately 
· fi 129 supervise per ormance. 
126 For example Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law (2ed, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), GH Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative 
Account (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989), Nigel Foster German Legal System & laws (2ed, 
Blackstone Press, London, 1996). 
127 
[ 1998] AC I. 
128 GH Treitel Remedies f or Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989) 69. 
129 Gareth Jones & William Goodhart Specific Perfo rmance (Butterworths, London, 1986) 2. 
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2 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd 
Currently, the highest common law appellate court decision regarding the 
availability of specific performance is Argyll. In Argyll the House of Lords 
reiterated the common law's continued preference for damages as the primary 
remedy for breach of contract. A restrictive approach towards specific 
performance was confirmed by their Lordships' because of the potential strain on 
the administration of justice. The relevance of this decision to New Zealand was 
confirmed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Attorney-General for England 
and Wales v R.130 
(a) The facts 
Argyll leased the largest unit in a shopping centre from Co-operative 
Insurance for 3 5 years from August 1979. The lease included covenants obliging 
Argyll to use the premises as a supermarket and to keep the premises open for 
retail trade during normal business hours. The lease also enabled Argyll to 
assign it. In 1995, having suffered a substantial loss the previous trading year, 
Argyll gave notice they intended to close the supermarket. Co-operative 
Insurance responded by asking Argyll to keep the store open until a suitable 
assignee could be fow1d and offered a temporary rent reduction because they 
were concerned about the effect the closure would have on the other stores in the 
shopping centre. The supermarket was the anchor tenant and its prolonged 
closure would lead to fewer customers at the shopping centre and a 
corresponding reduction in the level of rents Co-operative Insurance could 
charge other tenants. Argyll did not respond to this request and instead stripped 
the supermarket of its fixtures and fittings and immediately closed the 
supermarket. Co-operative Insurance immediately commenced proceedings for 
specific performance and/or damages. It was estimated the cost of refitting the 
supermarket would exceed £ 1 million. 
In the summary proceedings Judge Maddock granted an order for 
damages. An order for specific performance was refused on the basis that it was 
130 [2002] 2 NZLR 91 , 120 Tipping J (CA). 
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long standing practice that damages were the appropriate remedy for a breach of 
a keep-open covenant and Argyll would incur vastly disproportionate costs if 
ordered to re-open the supermarket. 
(b) The Court of Appeal's decision 
The English Comi of Appeal (Legatt and Roch LJJ, Millett LJ dissenting) 
allowed Co-operative Insurance's appeal and granted specific performance. Lord 
Leggatt was of the opinion that an award of damages would be unlikely to 
compensate Co-operative Insurance fully and in particular the losses of the other 
tenants would not be recoverable unless they were reflected by a reduction in 
rent. Furthermore, any costs involved in reopening the store were due to Argyll 
Store's failure to respond to Co-operative Insurance's letter. Argyll had acted 
with "great commercial cynicism" rather than keeping "an unambiguous 
promise". 131 
Lord Roch was also of the opinion that specific performance should be 
granted because damages would be an inadequate remedy.
132 Argyll's 
obligations were sufficiently well defined and day-to-day supervision by the 
133 
court would not be necessary. Importantly, Lord Roch found it 
"inconceivable" that Argyll would not run the store efficiently if ordered to 
reopen. Furthermore Argyll had acted "wantonly and quite unreasonably" in 
removing the fixtures and fittings without answering Co-operative Insurance's 
letter. 134 
Lord Millett dissented on the basis that ordering a business to remam 
open had the potential to expose the promisor to "potentially large unquantifiable 
and unlimited losses which may be out of all proportion to the loss which his 
breach of contract has caused".
135 Lord Millet was of the opinion that specific 
performance should only be granted if it is appropriate to do so. The inadequacy 
131 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [ 1996] 3 All ER 934, 940 
(CA). 
132 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 941 (CA). 
133 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 943 (CA). 
134 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 943 (CA). 
135 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 948 (CA). 
of damages would be one factor in determining whether specific performance 
was appropriate but the potential effect on the defendant must also be considered, 
since equitable remedies are an instrument of justice and must be refused when 
there is the potential they will become "instruments of oppression".136 
The order for specific performance was suspended for three months to 
allow Argyll to complete an assignment of the lease to another supermarket 
chain. 137 
( c) The House of Lords ' Decision 
Despite the order for specific performance never commg into effect 
(because of the assignment) the House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal ' s 
decision. Their Lordships were of the opinion that the practice of not ordering 
specific performance where there is an agreement to carry on a business is not 
based on the inadequacy or otherwise of damages but rather on the court ' s 
concern that they would need to be inappropriately involved in the supervision of 
order. The cost of supervising the performance of the contract through "an 
indefinite" series of rulings was undesirable. 
138 
Furthermore, their Lordships were concerned that contempt of courts 
proceedings are too powerful to be a suitable mechanism for resolving private 
disputes. 139 First, the threat of contempt proceedings requires the promisor to run 
a business, they did not think was commercially viable, under the threat of 
breaching the court order. Secondly, the seriousness of a finding of contempt of 
court will mean the litigation is drawn out and expensive. 
140 
136 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 949 (CA). 
137 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [ 1998] AC I, 9 Lord 
Hoffman (for the court) (HL). 
138 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 12 Lord Hoffman 
(for the court) (HL). 
139 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 12 Lord Hoffman 
(for the court) (H L) . 
14° Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 13 Lord Hoffman 
(for the court) (HL). 
31 
Lord Hoffman also drew a distinction between orders requiring the 
performance of an activity and orders requiring a result to be achieved. His 
Lordship was of the opinion that in the case of orders requiring a result, even if 
they require a complicated process to be achieved, the court is only called upon 
to judge the final result meaning the supervision objection is of no concern. This 
distinction explained why the courts have in the past awarded specific 
performance of building contracts and repair covenants. 
141 
However, even in cases where a result is desired, an order for specific 
performance should not be made where the order cannot be formulated with 
sufficient precision. If the order lacks precision, the same expensive litigation 
will arise because the court will be required to clarify matters or otherwise the 
promiser will unfairly incur additional expenses through over compliance.
142 
That a contract is sufficiently certain for the purposes of contract formation does 
not necessarily mean that the terms are precise enough to be specifically 
performed. 143 
Lord Hoffman was of the opinion that the clause in the contract between 
Argyll and Co-operative Insurance requiring the store to remain open was not 
sufficiently definite because it did not specify the level of trade or the area of the 
premises in which trade must be conducted. 
144 The way the promiser previously 
performed the promise cannot be the measure of the obligation under the 
contract. 145 
His Lordship was al so of the opinion that it is not wise of the courts to 
make somebody carry on a business at a loss if there is a viable alternative for 
14 1 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 13 Lord Hoffman 
(for the court) (HL). 
142 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 13 Lord Hoffman 
(for the court) (HL). 
143 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 14 Lord Hoffman 
(for the court) (HL). 
144 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 16 Lord Hoffman 
(for the court) (HL). 
145 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 17 Lord Hoffman 
(for the court) (HL). 
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compensating the promisee. 
146 An award of damages brings the conflict to an 
end allowing the parties to 'heal their wounds' without the 'yoke of a hostile 
relationship' .147 
Lord Hoffman rejected the argument that if the order became oppressive 
it could be varied or discharged on application by the promisor on the grounds 
that an order would be a final order which could only be discharged where the 
injuncted activities had been legalised by statute. Even if there was jurisdiction 
to discharge an order because of a change in circumstances which made it 
oppressive, the potential for oppression would have been entirely predictable at 
the date the order. Accordingly, there would have been no changed 
circumstances sufficient to warrant the discharge of the order.
148 
( d) Critique of the House of Lords' decision 
The decision of the House of Lords raises a number of legitimate 
concerns about how specific performance works in practice. However, their 
approach to resolving these concerns was unduly narrow and failed to draw on 
the experiences of civil law jurisdictions that have already addressed these issues. 
Their Lordships' first concern was that an order to keep the store open would 
lead to multiple applications to resolve issues concerning the quality of the 
performance. In Argyll this was irrelevant because the contract had in fact 
already been assigned. If there is the potential that an award of specific 
performance will give rise to continuous applications to the courts this should be 
established and weighed in each case.
149 Berryman has suggested that it is best 
to adopt a "wait and see" approach. The decree of specific performance should 
14 6 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 15 Lord Hoffman 
(for the court) (HL). 
147 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 16 Lord Hoffman 
(for the court) (HL). 
148 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd, above, 18 Lord Hoffman 
(for the court) (HL). 
149 Andrew M Tettenborn "Absolving the Undeserving: Shopping Centres, Specific Performance 
and the Law of Contract" (1998) Conv & Prop Law 23, 31. 
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be granted and if the feared multiple actions arise the court can revert to damages 
to bring finality to the dispute. 150 
The experience of the German courts also casts doubt on the extent of the 
supervision issue. Creditors in Germany tend only to bring claims for specific 
performance when their interest in performance is not easily compensated by 
money. But if performance is possible and the creditor elects performance, the 
courts are bound to order specific performance. 
151 The primacy of specific 
performance, adopted in the Btirgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code) in 
1900, has not lead to German contract Jaw being unworkable, the German courts 
being overburdened, or to litigation being unduly delayed. 
Furthermore, in a commercial situation two factors will help ensure that 
only proper applications are brought before the court. First, the cost of litigation 
and the courts ability to award costs will discourage inappropriate 
applications. 152 Secondly, the parties will be discouraged from being unduly 
adversarial because of the adverse effect prolonged litigation will have on their 
reputations and where applicable the confidence of investors. Reputation is the 
most important non-legal control of breaches of contract. Breaching contracts 
and a litigious approach to conflict resolution can affect both the possibility of 
repeat business and the level of new business through inter-consumer 
information exchange. 153 
Their Lordships were also concerned that contempt proceedings were too 
powerful a tool to be used to resolve private disputes. This concern, which 
echoes that of the courts of chancery, fails to appreciate that in all matters 
between two private citizens, whether the proceedings are before the Family 
Court, the Environment Court, or the High Court, the courts ultimate sanction for 
150 Professor Jeff Berryman " Recent Developments in the Law of Equitable Remedies: What 
Canada Can Do For You" (Paper presented to the New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Victoria 
University of Wellington, l August 2001) 26. 
151 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz Introduction to Comparative law (2ed, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1992) 507. 
152 Tettenborn, above, 31 . 
153 Thomas S Ulen "The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of 
Contract Remedies" (1984) 83 Michigan Law Review 341 , 347. 
34 
breach of its orders is to the hold the perpetrator in contempt of court. If the 
' spectre' of contempt of court is too powerful a tool when resolving contractual 
disputes, it must be similarly inappropriate to use it in other disputes between 
private parties. 
The concern that the promisor will be forced to run a business which they 
have already determined is uneconomical also fails to appreciate the nature of an 
order for specific performance. In cases such as Argyll the order will operate to 
ensure that the promisor fulfils the obligation they undertook to assign the lease 
if they did not want to personally fulfil the contract for the full term. Argyll had 
undertaken the risk of finding a suitable assignee. This allocation of risk would 
have been reflected in the 'price' of the contract. Alternatively, the promisor 
will negotiate with the promisee to vary or cancel the contract. The most a 
defendant would be willing to pay in post-breach negotiations is the cost of 
ending the contract. In cases where the defendant has the power to assign the 
contract the cost of assigning the contract will be the most they will be prepared 
to 'pay ' the plaintiff to cancel the contract. 154 
The related concern that the order may not be obeyed and that the courts 
will be brought in to disrepute if their orders to specifically perform are not 
complied with does not account for the importance of reputation. In the context 
of business relationships the importance of reputation will ensure that, except in 
the most extreme cases, the courts orders will be complied with. 
155 
The House of Lord ' s made two distinctions which are of questionable 
value. The first distinction was between cases where a result is required and 
cases which require the performance of an activity. This distinction was 
extremely pragmatic as it distinguished the building cases, where specific 
performance has been awarded, from the case before the Court. The distinction 
is not sound in practice. Although different activities, the level of detail and co-
operation required to complete a building and operate a supermarket are unlikely 
to be that different. There is the same potential for conflict about the details of 
154 Tettenborn, above, 35. 
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the operation and the same need for interim injunctions, albeit in building cases 
this may be over a shorter time frame, in which case Berryman's "wait and see" 
approach remains the most appropriate. In either the building cases or other 
situations the potential for repeat applications should be one factor in 
determining whether or not specific performance is appropriate. This should be 
determined on a case by case basis. 
The second distinction made by their Lordships was the distinction 
between sufficient certainty for the purposes of contract formation and the level 
of precision required for the order of specific performance. Clause 4(19) of the 
contract required Argyll Stores "To keep the demised premises open for retail 
trade during the usual hours of business in the locality and the display windows 
properly dressed in a suitable manner in keeping with a good class parade of 
shops." Clause 4(12)(a) specified that the user of the premises was "Not to use 
or suffer to be used the demised premises other than as a retail store for the sale 
of food groceries provisions and goods normally sold from time to time by a 
retail grocer food supermarkets and food superstores." Lord Hoffman held that 
these were not sufficiently precise to be the basis of an order of specific 
performance. 
The basis for the distinction between the level of certainty required for 
contract formation (the basis upon which damages would be awarded) and the 
level of precision required for an order of specific performance was connected to 
the concern that multiple actions would be required to determined the promisee ' s 
obligations. The conceptual difficulty with this distinction is that if the 
promisee's obligations are not sufficiently clear when examined by a reasonable 
person there is no contract. However, if objectively there is a contract it must be 
clear to a reasonable person what the promisee's obligations are. In practice the 
Court ' s concern will be dealt with in one of two ways. First, the importance of 
maintaining a professional enterprise will ensure that the promisee will perform. 
Secondly, even if they do not maintain a professional enterprise Berryman' s 
"wait and see" approach should be adopted. If and when a problem does arise 
155 Ulen, above, 349. 
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the Court can deal with this by ruling as to the extent of the promisee ' s 
obligations or if necessary bringing the proceedings to an end and awarding 
damages. If plaintiffs in building cases are entitled to specific performance, 
taking the risk that certain obligations within the contract will only sound in 
damages, there is no reason why the same rule should not apply to 'keep open' 
covenants. 156 
The idea that an award of damages allows the parties to rid themselves of 
the ' yoke of litigation' and ' heal their wounds' fails to recognise that damages do 
not necessarily compensate a promisee for the harm suffered. Consequently they 
are left to ' heal' their own wounds while the promisor, who was responsible for 
causing the harm, is able to move on without being fully held to account. The 
concept of the ' yoke of litigation' is also unrealistic when the dispute is between 
two commercial parties. The contract between the tenant and the landlord does 
not require day-to-day contact or a high level of trust. Argyll was not going to be 
forced to have a personal relationship with Co-operative Insurance. 
Furthermore, it is also important to acknowledge that Argyll was the 
anchor tenant in the shopping complex. The anchor tenant has "consumer 
drawing power" which is attractive to smaller tenants who are able to benefit 
from the increased number of potential customers. The smaller tenants pay a 
premium through higher rents for this benefit while the anchor tenant receives a 
corresponding reduction in their rent. 157 Argyll's role as anchor tenant would 
have been reflected in the contractual terms. The importance of its role as anchor 
tenant, to both Co-operative Insurance and the other tenants, was not disputed by 
Argyll . Although the interests of the other tenants are not strictly before the 
Court there is no reason why their interest in performance should not be 
considered in determining whether or nor specific performance is appropriate. 
158 
156 Tettenborn, above, 31. 
157 Professor Jeff Berryman " Recent Developments in the Law of Equitable Remedies: What 
Canada Can Do For You" (Paper presented to the New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Victoria 
University of Wellington, l August 2001) 23 . 
158 Tettenborn, above, 34. 
37 
Lord Hoffman's opinion that final orders cannot be varied or discharged 
when circumstances change is doubtful because the courts already have the 
power to vary orders for specific performance where performance becomes 
impossible due to the promisee's default. 159 Furthermore, there is nothing to 
prevent a court, when framing the order for specific performance, from giving 
leave to the parties to apply for the order to be discharged or varied. 160 
Alternatively, it is possible that if circumstances changed sufficiently the 
doctrine of frustration would apply. If the contract became oppressive or 
impossible then the promisee could rely upon the doctrine of frustration which 
would be complete defence to an order to specifically performance the contract. 
In Johnson v Agnew 161 House of Lords held that the non-performance of a 
specific performance decree was a continuing breach which entitled the promisee 
to bring a common law action from breach. 162 In such a case the promisor would 
then be entitled to damages. Surely it is more appropriate for the promisor, 
rather than the court, to decide whether or not to accept that risk. 
Finally, although parties are not able to contract to ensure the contract is 
specifically performed in the event of breach, they could contract to have 
damages as the only remedy. 163 This would not need to be a liquidated damages 
clause but a simple declaration that the parties in the event of breach request the 
arbitrator or courts to assess damages rather than ordering specific performance. 
3 Is there really a problem? 
The concern that the Courts will not be able to effectively supervise 
performance and that specific performance will create further litigation is 
159 Sudaghar Singh v Nazeer [ 1979] Ch 474. 
160 Tettenborn, above, 38. 
161 
[ 1980] AC 367. 
162 Professor Jeff Berryman " Recent Developments in the Law of Equitable Remedies: What 
Canada Can Do For You" (Paper presented to the New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Victoria 
University of Wellington, I August 2001) 25. 
163 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [ 1996] 3 All ER 934, 940 
Leggatt LJ . 
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undermined by the success of the courts in supervising complex matters, such as 
civil rights and antitrust cases, over long periods of time. 164 
Furthermore, difficulties in determining whether or not the promisor has 
adequately performed the contract is an unconvincing reason for the court 
refusing to award specific performance because the same issue is continually 
raised in claims for damages. Assessing the performance received in relation to 
the promises made is no more difficult in a claim for performance than in a claim 
16-for damages. ) 
Judges will be required to spend longer formulating the required 
orders. 166 However, this increase should be more than offset by the saving of not 
having to calculate damages. Another way of resolving this concern would be to 
adopt the German approach to the phrasing of orders. A plaintiff is required to 
set out with sufficient precision his or her demand. 167 The Court will not grant 
anything the plaintiff has not requested, although they can of course grant less or 
nothing at all. 168 This puts the onus of formulating the claim, and subsequent 
order, on the plaintiff who is seeking specific performance. 
B Personal Freedom 
Specific performance is also criticised for imposing "unduly onerous 
personal obligations" on the defendant when the plaintiff would be sufficiently 
compensated by an award of damages. 169 At common law specific performance 
will be denied in cases of contracts for service " .. .lest they [the courts] should 
turn contracts of service into contracts of slavery." 170 There is concern that 
specific performance may amount to an undue interference with the personal 
164 Alan Schwartz "The Case for Specific Performance" (1979) 89 Yale Law Journal 271 ,293. 
165 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law (2ed, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1992) 521 . 
166 Schwaitz, above, 293. 
167 Zivilprozessordnung (German Code of Civil Procedure) s 253. 
168 Zivilprozessordnung (German Code of Civil Procedure) s 308 . 
169 Gareth Jones & William Goodhart Specific Performance (Butterworths, London, 1986) 2. 
170 De Francesco v Barnum ( 1890) 45 ChD 430, 438 Fry LJ . 
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freedom of the defendant especially when the performance can only be provided 
by personal performance. 171 
The concern that the promisor's liberty will be unjustifiably encroached 
upon is overstated. In all cases requiring the delivery of goods or in the case of 
services to be provided by a large corporation a decree of specific performance 
does not interfere with a person's or corporation's right of association. In the 
case of an individual performing personal services the loss of liberty argument is 
much stronger. 172 For this reason legal systems in which primacy is given to 
specific performance do not order specific performance unless the act "depends 
exclusively on the will of the debtor". 173 This does not include cases where a 
high level of personal skill or creativity is required. 174 For example a composer 
will not be ordered to write music nor will a law professor be required to write a 
legal commentary. Orders for specific performance are also not available in 
purely personal matters. Even though the promisor entered into the contract of 
their own volition these exceptions are justified on the basis of public policy. 
175 
However, an order for specific performance is still available if fulfilling the 
contractual obligation requires the co-operation of the promisor's employees or 
children as the promisor has direct influence over them.
176 
A corollary of the concern that the promisor's liberty will be unjustifiable 
encroached upon is the concern that an order of specific performance may also 
create an unjust balance of power between the parties. If the loss the promisor 
will suffer as the result of the order will significantly outweigh the benefit to the 
promisee in receiving the performance of that promise, the promisee is put in a 
position where they can negotiate the release of the promisor from their 
171 GH Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989) 47. 
172 Alan Schwartz "The Case for Specific Performance" (1979) 89 Yale Law Journal 271,297. 
173 Zivilprozessordnung (German Code of Civil Procedure) s 888 . 
174 OLG Frankfurt OLGE 29, 251 reported in Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz Introduction to 
Comparative law (2ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) 509. 
175 BGH, BGHZ 97, 372. 
176 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law (2ed, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1992) 508. 
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contractual obligations at a far higher value than the value of the performance. 177 
In the colourful language of Lord Westbury LC, the court must not "deliver over 
the defendants to the plaintiff bound hand and foot, in order to be made subject to 
any extortionate demand that he can possibly make". 178 Contractual remedies 
influence whether or not a party will breach their contract179 and determine the 
parties post-breach bargaining status. 180 The issue is determining the most 
appropriate balance between the promisee and the promisor. If damages are the 
primary remedy the promisee is put in a very disadvantageous position. Due to 
the cost of litigation and other mechanisms which prevent full recovery they are 
unlikely to be able to be truly compensated. Consequently, they may choose not 
to enforce their rights or to accept a low settlement offer believing they are 
making the best of a bad situation. If the choice is between putting the promisee 
or the promisor in a stronger post-breach bargaining position the promisee should 
be protected. Both normative concerns and common sense support the role of 
specific performance in protecting the promisee. The 'innocent' promisee surely 
has a greater moral claim to protection. Common sense suggests that the remedy 
which will give the breacher greater reason to pause will reduce the occurrence 
of breaches. 
C Unwanted Performance 
Even within a system that promotes performance of contractual 
obligations there must be some limits on when contracts should be performed. 
The proceeding discussion was in regard to the situation where the promisee 
wants to receive the performance they were promised. Different considerations 
arise in the case where it is the promisee who wishes to terminate the contract 
because they have no need of the item to be produced or service to be rendered. 
So long as the promisor is compensated for the profit he would have realised 
from the contract (subject to mitigation) there is no issue of unfairness. A buyer 
who terminates the contract is not doing so in an attempt to realise an unexpected 
177 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [ 1998] AC 1, 15 Lord 
Hoffman (for the court) (HL). 
178 Isenberg v East India House Estate Co Ltd (1863) 3 De GJ SS 263,273. 
179 Richard Craswell "In That Case What is the Question? Economics and the Demands of 
Contract Theory" (2003) 112 Yale LJ 903, 907 . 
benefit. They are merely minimising their own loss while ensuring the seller still 
receives the benefit they would have received if the contract had actually been 
fulfilled. 181 This approach resolves the issue raised in White & Carter 
(Councils) Ltd v McGregor 182 where the promisor proceeded with unwanted 
performance over a period of three years, and then claimed the price due under 
the contract, even though the promisee had attempted to cancel the contract on 
the same day it was made. 
Unwanted performance, which the prom1sor has no special interest in 
performing other than the financial profit the transaction will generate should be 
prevented and the promisor restricted to claiming damages. 183 Article 9: 101 (2) 
of the Principles of European Contract Law provides for this situation: 
Where the creditor has not yet performed its obligation and it is clear that the 
debtor will be unwilling to receive performance, the creditor may nonetheless proceed 
with its performance and may recover any sum due under the contract unless : 
(a) it could have made a reasonable substitute transaction 
without significant effort or expense; or 
(b) performance would be unreasonable in the circumstances. 
This is also dealt with in article 649 of the Btirgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(German Civil Code) which provides that the promisee can terminate the contract 
so long as they pay compensation to the promisor. Where the benefit one party 
will receive under the contract is purely financial profit, damages will fully 
compensate them for the premature termination of the contract. A restriction on 
their ability to claim performance in which they have no legitimate interest is a 
valid check in any system which has specific performance as the primary remedy 
for breach. 
180 Richard Craswell "Contract Remedies, Renegotiation , and the Theory of Efficient Breach" 
( 1988) 61 S Cal L Rev 629, 640. 
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182 1962 SC (HL) 1. 
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D Commercial Expectations 
Specific perfom1ance has also been resisted as being contrary to the 
reasonable commercial expectation of the parties. The primacy of damages has 
been justified as reflecting what the parties would have done. When the subject 
of the contract is unique, so damages would be inadequate compensation, it is 
appropriate to award specific performance because the parties to a contract 
would themselves reasonably expect to do that if required to put such a clause in 
the contract. Consequently the default position of the law can be justified 
because it meets the reasonable expectations of contracting parties and is more 
efficient because the clause does not need to be negotiated.
184 By reflecting 
normal commercial expectations the law allows the breaching party to make the 
most efficient use of the resources available to them. 
185 
Another reason why specific performance has been resisted is because 
judges neither have the necessary skills nor the knowledge to second guess 
business decisions. An order of specific performance could perpetuate loss-
making activities and ultimately affect society's economic well-being, in 
particular if repeated applications to the court are necessary to enforce the 
order. 186 
The concerns about common practice and commercial expectations, such 
as those expressed above and by Lord Millet, 
187 are not good arguments for 
retaining a restricted approach to the availability of specific performance. They 
merely demonstrate that the appropriate method of change is legislation. 
Han1mond's recommendation of a short code setting out New Zealand's remedial 
framework is a sensible method of reform. 
188 A short code establishing the 
principles and availability of specific performance would enable the legal and 
commercial communities to adjust. New Zealand has enacted such legislation 
184 Anthony Kronman "Specific Performance" ( 1978) 45 U Chi LR 351, 365. 
185 Gareth Jones & William Goodhart Specific Performance (Butterworths, London, 1986) 2. 
186 Hwee Ying Yeo "Specific Performance: Covenant to Keep Business Running" ( 1998) JBL 
254,256. 
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(CA). 
43 
without undue difficulty in the past. 189 Furthermore there is a wealth of models 
and experience, including the CISG and the Blirgerliches Gesetzbuch (German 
Civil Code), to draw upon. In particular the code should stipulate that the parties 
are free to nominate damages as their preferred remedy and that the courts are 
able to vary or discharge the award if subsequently the contract becomes 
impossible to perform. 190 
E Summary 
The third justification for the primacy of damages in the common law is 
the concern that specific performance will burden the administration of justice. 
The House of Lords in Argyll were concerned an order for specific performance 
would give rise to "an indefinite" series of rulings to determine the scope of the 
promiser's contractual obligations and ensure they were being adequately 
executed. Though their Lordships raised legitimate questions about the 
implementation of specific performance they did not adequately address the 
various solutions to their concerns. Most importantly they did not consider the 
experiences of civil law jurisdictions that have over one hundred years of 
experience to draw upon. The concerns raised by their Lordships' can be 
adequately resolved through a combination of legal and non-legal measures to 
ensure specific performance is both effective and appropriate. 
VII THE ADVANTAGES OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
This section evaluates the arguments that underpin the claim that specific 
performance should be the primary remedy for breach of contract in New 
Zealand. These include that specific performance gives greater weight to the 
value of the parties' promises, increases freedom of contract and party autonomy, 
188 Grant Hammond "The Place of Damages in the Scheme of Remedies" in PD Finn (Ed) Essays 
on Damages (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1992) 192, 228. 
189 For example the Contracts Privity Act 1982. 
19° For example pursuant to section 767 of the Zivilprozessordnung (German Code of Civil 
Procedure) the original order granting specific performance can be declared to be unenforceable 
(in whole or in part) if the contract is impossible to perform. 
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fosters good faith in contractual relations, and gives greater effect to New 
Zealand's international obligations. Specific performance is also a more 
practical remedy because it reduces conflict more effectively than damages and 
promotes efficiency. 
A The Philosophical Advantages of Specific Performance 
I The value of a promise 
A legal system that imposes strict limitations on the availability of 
specific performance undermines the parties trust in the contract.
191 When 
people enter into a contractual relationship it is with the expectation that the 
other party will fulfil the promises they made. 192 Ordering specific performance 
for breach of contract vindicates the promisee's decision to enter into the 
contract. It vindicates both the trust the promisee placed in the other party and 
their use of a contract. Individual breaches are unlikely to undermine the 
contractual institution. However, allowing breaches to be 'bought', as advocated 
by the efficient breach theory and any system that restricts performance based 
remedies, undermines the integrity of a system premised upon the free exchange 
of reciprocal obligations for mutual gain. If people cannot rely on the contract, 
or the legal system to vindicate the contract, they will have to create additional, 
alternative mechanisms to ensure they can rely on the agreement. Such 
mechanisms could include the parties making good faith deposits or performance 
bonds with a third party which in the event of breach are paid to the promise. 
Such bonds are used in the building industry to protect subcontractors.
193 
2 Supporting freedom of contract and party autonomy 
Specific performance is the best method of compensating a promisee for 
breach of contract because it gives the exact performance bargained for.
194 
19 1 Daniel Friedmann "The Efficient Breach Fallacy" (1989) 18 J Legal Stud I, 7. 
192 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz Introduction to Comparative law (2ed, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1992) 504. 
193 Thomas S Ulen "The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of 
Contract Remedies" ( 1984) 83 Michigan Law Review 341 , 349. 
194 Alan Schwartz "The Case for Specific Performance" (1979) 89 Yale Law Journal 271, 274. 
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Equally the promiser is only required do what they freely promised to do. In this 
way specific performance supports the principle of freedom of contract because 
it merely requires effect to be given to the parties own declarations of will. 
Furthermore specific performance best protects the promisee's subjective 
valuation of the performance of the contract. 195 When damages are assessed the 
promisee's expectations are disregarded and instead the 'fair' market valuation of 
the performance is awarded. 196 This also supports freedom of contract because 
the parties' own determination of value is respected and is not later artificially 
constructed by the court. 
Specific performance is also consistent with the principle of party 
autonomy because it empowers the promisee to determine whether performance 
of the contractual obligations, although delayed, is still the best mechanism for 
remedying the breach. It should be the promisee's choice to risk defective 
performance of the contract. 197 Although damages will in many situations satisfy 
the promisee's interest in performance, it is unsatisfactory that in common law 
systems the court determines what the promisee' s best interests are. The fact that 
a promisee is seeking performance, with the inherent risk of further delay and 
defective performance, demonstrates the promisee's belief that damages are in 
fact inadequate. The mere fact that the court disagrees with this assessment 
should not, by itself, justify rejection of the claim. 
198 
3 Good faith 
As discussed above, although there is no general obligation of good faith 
in New Zealand's contract law, the principle underpins aspects of the law and its 
scope continues to be developed. 199 This section demonstrates how specific 
performance supports good faith. 
1~ Ulen, abov~366. 
196 PS Atiyah An introduction to the Law of Contract (5
1
" Ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000) 
431. 
197 Schwartz, above, 304. 
198 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz introduction to Comparative Law (2ed, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1992) 521. 
199 See paragraph V(C)(4)(b) above. 
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Specific performance promotes good faith both in contract formation and 
m situations where the contract comes to a premature end. Although 
compensatory damages are a sufficient deterrent for 'good faith ' breaches of 
contract, they are ineffective at deterring 'bad faith' breaches.
200 Distinguishing 
between parties who breach in good faith (the breach was not wilful or was done 
with the intention of benefiting the other party) and those who breach in bad faith 
(those who do not have a legal excuse usually because they breached to benefit 
themselves) is important when understanding how remedies impact upon 
behaviour. 201 By their very nature good faith breaches do not need to be deterred 
although they do need to be appropriately resolved. In comparison, bad faith 
breaches need to be deterred. A person who breaches a contract in bad faith 
should be required to specifically perform the contract or have the highest 
possible measure of expectation damages awarded against them to deter further 
breaches. This will ensure a high level of trust and confidence in business 
transactions. 202 
One of the criticisms of specific performance is that it can lead to the 
promisee receiving a better bargain than was originally anticipated by the parties. 
In cases where the cost of completion or repair is significantly higher than the 
diminished value the courts have labelled the excess in recovery a ' windfall ' to 
the promisee. The term windfall is misleading because the excess recovery is 
merely the promisee's profit on the bargain which they negotiated and gave 
consideration for. 203 If the promisee decides to 'pocket' the damages there has 
been no unjust enrichment because the money was owed under a legally binding 
agreement.204 Similarly, if the cost of specific performance significantly exceeds 
the increase in value, there has been no unjust enrichment because the promisee 
is merely insisting on the fulfilment of the valid promise made and received. The 
promisee is not acting in bad faith by seeking to have the contract fulfilled on its 
200 Linda Curtis "Damage Measurements for Bad Faith Breach of Contract: An Economic 
Analysis" ( 1986) 39 Stan L Rev 161 , 182. 
20 1 Patricia H Marschall "Willfullness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for Breach of 
Contract" (1982) 24 Ariz L Rev 733 , 741. 
202 Marschall, above, 760. 
203 Marschall , above, 746. 
204 Marschall , above, 746-7. 
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original terms. Rather the promisor, without justification, is seeking to avoid the 
risk of increased costs which they undertook during contract formation. 
4 Consistency with International Law 
The theoretical divide between the civil law and the common law 
approach to performance remains a serious impediment to the unification of 
international sales law.205 The United Nations Convention for the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG) adopts the general civil law principle that the non-
breaching party is entitled to require performance. Importantly, specific 
performance is not excluded when the non-breaching party could have entered 
into a substitute transaction although failure to do so may amount to a failure to 
mitigate under Article 77. The only consequence for a failure to mitigate under 
the CISG is a reduction in damages, which is not applicable to the right to require 
performance. 
Under the CISG the general principle is that the aggrieved party may 
require performance of the contract unless they have resorted to a remedy that is 
inconsistent with a claim for performance. An example of behaviour that is 
inconsistent with performance would include declaring the contract avoided due 
to a fundamental breach206 by the other party.
207 If the seller delivers goods that 
are not in accordance with the contract the buyer can only require substitute 
goods if the variation between the goods delivered and the contractual 
specifications amounts to a fundamental breach and they make a formal request 
for substitute goods to be delivered.
208 
Article 46(3) of the CISG provides: 'If the goods do not conform with the 
contract, the buyer may require the seller to remedy the lack of conformity by 
repair unless this is unreasonable having regard to all the circun1stances.' 
Whether specific performance is available depends on the law of the country in 
205 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law (2ed, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1992) 520. 
206 Defined in A1ticle 25 as a breach that" ... results in such detriment to the other party as 
substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract ... ". 
207 The seller has the right to avoid pursuant to Article 49(1) and buyer pursuant to Article 64. 
208 Article 46(2) . 
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which performance is sought pursuant to Article 26. If specific performance is 
not available Article 46(3) is only relevant to the calculation of damages. 
The Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act 1994 (the Act) came 
into force on 1 October 1995.
209 It enacts the CISG as a code in New Zealand 
with respect to contracts for the international sale of goods to which it applies.
210 
Even though the CISG emphasises the importance of performing the contract, 
because Article 28 permits the approach of the domestic legal system to be 
applied, New Zealand's courts are not bound to order specific performance but 
can continue to apply the adequacy test. Although New Zealand's courts are not 
bound to order specific performance it will be more appropriate if they do so 
because of the emphasis on performance in the CISG. 
B The Practical Advantages of Specific Performance 
1 Specific performance reduces conflict 
The frequency of breach will be reduced where specific performance and 
restitution are provided because the promisor has less, if anything, to gain from 
breach.211 Consequently, the resources required to resolve breaches will also be 
reduced. 
Specific performance also fosters bargaining.
212 Resolving problems post 
breach is very expensive.
2 13 Therefore it is better to have as the primary remedy 
a mechanism which encourages negotiation before a breach occurs. Where the 
promisor' s has received a better offer they can use the additional profit they will 
make to ' purchase' the promisee' s consent to a variation or termination of the 
original contract.214 As negotiation is less adversarial than litigation the level of 
conflict is still further reduced. 
209 Reg 2 Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act Commencement Order 1995 (SR 
1995/ 168). 
2 10 Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act 1994, s 5. 
2 11 Daniel Friedmann "The Efficient Breach Fallacy" ( 1989) 18 J Legal Stud I, 7. 
2 12 Jan R Macneil "Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky" (1982) 68 Va L R 947, 960. 
2 13 Macneil, above, 968-9 . 
2 14 Thomas S Ulen "The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of 
Contract Remedies" ( 1984) 83 Michigan Law Review 341, 373 . 
49 
2 Specific performance is the most efficient remedy 
The remedy that will achieve the greatest efficiency in the exchange and 
breach of contractual obligations is specific performance.
215 The number of 
cases in which damage awards are unable to fully compensate the promisee 
outnumbers the number of cases in which specific performance is granted. 
Therefore, the rationale for the intervention of contract law supports the use of 
specific performance. 
216 If a promisor is not liable for the social costs of the 
breach they have an inefficiently stronger incentive to breach.
217 In comparison, 
if parties are aware that their contract will be specifically enforced they will have 
a strong incentive to efficiently allocate the risks associated with the contract 
d · · .: · 218 unng its 1ormation. 
Transaction costs, in particular contract negotiation costs, will be lower if 
specific performance is the routine remedy for breach of contract. Those who 
place a high subjective value on the performance of the contract will not need to 
negotiate in order to avoid the inadequacy of contract damages nor be subject to 
the cost of proving the inadequacy of damages in court. Those who would prefer 
damages will be able to inexpensively nominate damages in a standard form 
remedial clause.
219 
Litigation costs will be reduced because there will be fewer disputes. The 
difficult evidentiary issues that currently require determination when trying to 
claim that damages are unique will not arise.
220 With specific performance the 
courts factual enquiries stop as soon as it has been determined that a breach has 
occurred. This eliminates the need to hear evidence on the calculation of 
dan1ages. 221 The parties can then resolve the issue of the breach by negotiating a 
settlement or by performing the contract. In this way an award of specific 
2 15 Ulen, above, 343. 
2 16 Alan Schwartz "The Case for Specific Performance" (1979) 89 Yale Law Journal 271 , 275 . 
2 17 Linda Curtis "Damage Measurements for Bad Faith Breach of Contract: An Economic 
Analysis" ( 1986) 39 Stan L Rev 161 , 170. 
2 18 Ulen, above, 365. 
2 19 Ulen, above, 378-9. 
2m Ulen,abov~379. 
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performance is, like an injunction, an ultimatum to the promisor -
perform your 
promise or negotiate to resolve the dispute.
222 
VIII CONCLUSION 
In New Zealand the primary remedy for breach of contract is da
mages. 
Specific performance is a discretionary remedy available when
 damages are 
' inadequate'. The historical basis for the common law approach to
 damages and 
the adequacy test are not relevant to New Zealand's commercial
 environment. 
Despite this, two additional justifications have been accepted fo
r maintaining 
damages as the primary remedy for breach of contract in comm
on law legal 
systems. 
The first modem justification is the theory of efficient breach. The
 theory 
of efficient breach has been developed by academics to both expl
ain and justify 
the primacy of damages in the common law remedial framework. T
he civil law' s 
preferences for specific performance is rejected as inefficient beca
use parties are 
bound to fulfil their contractual obligations irrespective of the m
ore attractive 
supervening opportunities. The theory is premised upon increasing
 the aggregate 
wealth of society by facilitating the most efficient use of resources.
 Despite, this 
laudable ambition the theory of efficient breach is conceptually flaw
ed because it 
gives no weight to the normative value of the law. It fails to account fo
r the legal 
system' s role in preventing and resolving conflict, the purpose 
of creating a 
contract, the intrinsic value of a promise, and the law' s concern to p
revent people 
from profiting from their own wrongdoing. Furthermore, the theo
ry of efficient 
breach does not work in practice because it is very difficult 
to accurately 
determine the costs that will be incurred if the promisor breaches
 and therefore 
the promisor is unable to make an informed decision about whet
her or not the 
breach will actually be efficient. 
22 1 Ulen, above, 384. 
222 Ulen, above, 399. 
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In addition the legal system prevents the theory of efficient breach 
working in practice because of doctrines that limit the promisee's ability to 
recover the full extent of their loss. However, even without the operation of 
these doctrines the theory is in itself inefficient because it creates additional and 
unnecessary transactions. Finally, the theory of efficient breach assumes that 
parties are rational economic actors who will accept the operation of the theory. 
Due to these difficulties and its inconsistency with other intersecting areas of law 
(including other aspects of contract law, torts, restitution and the doctrine of good 
faith) the theory of efficient breach as a 'modern' justification for perpetuating 
the supremacy of damages in common law systems must be rejected. 
Judicial justification for the common law's preference for damages has 
focused on the impact ordering specific performance may have on the 
administration of justice. The concern that specific performance is a threat to the 
administration of justice because of the need to constantly supervise and re-
litigate the issues must be rejected. The experience of Germany demonstrates 
that commercial parties prefer an award of damages in the normal case of generic 
goods or services which are readily available from other providers. However, 
when specific performance is claimed there are both legal and non-legal 
mechanisms to ensure that unmeritorious claims are prevented. In this respect a 
"wait and see" approach should be adopted. If multiple actions do arise the court 
can revert to damages to bring finality to the dispute. Furthermore if 
circumstances change, and the parties have not negotiated to vary or discharge 
the contract, the courts will be able to ensure they can resolve the matter by 
giving leave to the parties to apply for the order to be discharged or varied. 
Ultimately the decision to risk faulty or delayed performance should be that of 
the promisee and not the court. Parties who do not want to have their contracts 
specifically performed in the event of breach can contract out of the presumption, 
an option not currently open to those who would prefer to contract to have their 
agreement specifically performed. 
The concern that the 'spectre' of contempt of court is inappropriate in 
contractual disputes fails to explain why cases of specific performance are of 
particular concern when the court has the same power in other disputes between 
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private parties. In cases where a high level of personal skill or creativity are 
required, or the order would require the parties to have a personal relationship, 
specific performance is not appropriate. However, in commercial contracts 
where the parties are dealing at arms length the concern that the promisor' s 
liberty will be unjustifiable encroached upon is overstated. Furthermore it is 
more appropriate that the promisee is put in a stronger post-breach negotiation 
than the promisor, who is protected by the primacy of damages. Cases of 
unwanted performance, where the promisor has no special interest in performing 
other than the financial profit the transaction will generate, should be prevented 
and the promisor restricted to claiming damages. 
Ordering specific performance for breach of contract vindicates the 
promisee's decision to enter into the contract. Specific performance is the best 
method of compensating a promisee for breach of contract because it gives the 
exact performance bargained for. This protects the promisee's subjective 
valuation of the performance. Although damages will in many situations satisfy 
the promisee ' s interest in performance, it is unsatisfactory that it is for the court 
to determine what the promisee 's best interests are. 
Specific performance promotes good faith both in contract formation and 
m situations where the contract comes to a premature end. Although, New 
Zealand' s courts are not bound to order specific performance in cases under the 
Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act 1994 it is more appropriate to do 
so because of the emphasis on performance in the CISG. The frequency of 
breach will also be reduced because specific performance fosters bargaining. 
This makes specific performance more efficient and lowers costs. Litigation 
costs will also be reduced. There will be fewer disputes and the difficult 
evidentiary issues that currently require determination when calculating 
damages, and trying to claim that damages are unique, will not arise. 
A transitional period will be required to allow both the legal and business 
communities to adjust to this change in approach. This should not cause undue 
difficulty, and is justified by the normative and practical advantages of specific 
performance as the primary remedy for breach of contract. The 
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recommendation is that New Zealand adopts the civil law approach making 
specific performance the primary remedy for breach of contract. 
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